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Abstract
Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate
institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms
of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak,
a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this
discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to
this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria
Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that
pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a
matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concernmixed-motive
games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight
people attribute to its rule.
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Introduction1
Strong institutions are important for a safe, prosperous and just society. In such a
society corruption is low, investment is high, and people enjoy equal opportunities.
Because of this, it is important to explain what makes an institution strong rather
than weak. An account of institutional strength requires a theory of institutions. The
most influential ones are equilibrium theories and rule theories (Rutherford 1994;
Greif and Kingston 2011). According to equilibrium theories, institutions are stable
behavioural regularities that solve coordination or cooperation problems.2 A virtue
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1This is the second part of a trilogy about norms and institutions. In the first, I introduce the Rules-and-
Equilibria Theory, which explains how social norms can motivate in the absence of sanctions (Hindriks 2019).
Here I use it to explicate the difference between strong and weak institutions. And in the third part, I discuss
why and how equilibrium theories and rule theories should be combined or unified (Hindriks 2021).
2See instance Lewis (1969), Ullmann-Margalit (1977), Schotter (1981), Sugden (1986), Binmore (1994),
Young (1998) and Binmore (2010).
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of these formal theories is that they model the motivation of the participants of
institutions in a precise manner. In contrast, rule theories regard institutions as
rules that structure human interaction.3 They lack the precision of equilibrium
theories (Greif and Kingston 2011: 14). However, they provide a rich account of
the normative dimension of institutions. Rules can justify behaviour and provide
participants with reasons for action. And a rule as such can motivate compliance
when people regard it as legitimate (Bicchieri 2006).
Ideally, a theory of institutions combines the best features of both kinds of
theories. In section 1, I present a hybrid theory that invokes both equilibria and
rules: The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory.4 I argue that it is precise and does
justice to the normativity of institutions. Because it is hybrid, it can capture
discrepancies between rules and behaviours, which arise when institutions are
weak. For instance, littering might be rampant even though a rule is in force
that prohibits it. An equilibrium theory equates this institution with observed
behaviour. In contrast, a rule theory identifies it with the rule that is violated.
The Rules-and-Equilibrium Theory accommodates both dimensions and takes
the institution to consist of a rule-governed behavioural regularity. Crucially,
a rule can govern behaviour even when it is not complied with. This means that
there might be norm-based pressures to behave in a certain way that fail to
produce compliance.
In section 2, I investigate how institutional strength can bemeasured.Whereas most
theories of institutions focus on one particular kind, I discuss both institutions that
serve to coordinate behaviours and those that require cooperation. This is
important in this context, because they concern different problems: the former
present problems of information, the latter problems of motivation. And this has
consequences for how their strength is to be measured. I propose that the strength
of a coordinative institution is primarily a matter of the expected degree of
compliance. In contrast, the strength of a cooperative institution can be measured
in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule. Together with the Rules-and-
Equilibria Theory, these measures constitute an important step towards
understanding institutional strength and explaining what makes an institution
strong rather than weak.
1. Institutions
1.1. Equilibrium theories
Theories of institutions can, roughly speaking, be divided into two kinds:
equilibrium theories and rule theories (Greif and Kingston 2011). Insofar as they
are economic theories, the latter are part of Old Institutionalism, whereas the
former represent New Institutionalism (Rutherford 1994). Equilibrium theories
originate with David Lewis’ (1969) theory of conventions. Such theories identify
institutions with stable behavioural regularities. Using the tools of game theory,
3Rule theories include Hart (1961), North (1990), Bloor (1997), Hodgson (2006) and Ostrom (2015).
4See Hindriks (2019) for an earlier version of this Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. It is closely related to the
Rules-in-Equilibrium Theory, which I discuss in section 1.4 (Hindriks and Guala 2015; Guala and Hindriks
2015; Guala 2016).
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they explain such regularities in terms of expectations about behaviours and
preferences that are conditional on them. For instance, people typically want to
match the way others greet them. Once a particular way of doing so is common,
no one has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the existing regularity.
This means that the regularity is stable and that the behaviour, or the strategy
players rely on, constitutes an equilibrium. Lewis was concerned with coordination
problems, or situations in which people’s preferences align. In addition to pure
coordination games, they include games such as hi-lo, the battle of the sexes,
and stag-hunt, in which payoffs differ between players or between equilibria.
In such situations, people benefit from coordinating their behaviour with that of
others. Solutions to coordination problems are conventions.
The idea that institutions are stable behavioural regularities has been extended
to cooperation problems (Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Schotter 1981; Sugden 1986;
Young 1998; Binmore 2010). Cooperation problems have a different structure: it
is beneficial for all if everybody cooperates; however, each individual has an
incentive to defect. Thus, they harbour a conflict of interest. Think, for instance,
of a situation in which you can dodge the bullet when it is your turn to pay for
a round of drinks, because people have not really been paying attention.
Cooperation problems concern mixed-motive games such as the prisoner’s
dilemma, the ultimatum game and the trust game.
Equilibrium theories invoke norms in particular to explain how conflicts of
interests can be resolved. They explicate norms in terms of sanctions, which are
negative responses to rule violations such as fines or frowns. Players expect to
incur sanctions with a certain probability. The expected costs of a sanction can
change their behaviour, because they lower the payoff of defecting. Cooperation
is secured if those costs are so large that the cooperation problem is thereby
transformed into a coordination problem (Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Bicchieri
2006). Thus, equilibrium theories model norms as sanction-induced regularities
in behaviour. I refer to this way of modelling norms as ‘the norms-as-sanctions
view.’5
Proponents of equilibrium theories commonly characterize institutions as
solutions to cooperation and coordination problems, in which case they require
compliance (Lewis 1969; Schotter 1981). In this vein, Guala maintains that
institutions are effective rules, which are ‘rules that people are motivated to
follow’ (Guala 2016: xxv). The problem with this is that, by requiring
compliance, such theories exclude weak institutions. As I discuss in more detail
in section 2, coordination institutions will be weak, for instance, when the
(expected) degree of conformity is low. Cooperation institutions are particularly
sensitive to the expected cost of sanctions, which depends on their probability
and severity. If it is too low, they are likely to be weak. Furthermore, the
probability with which norm violations are detected is influenced by the costs of
observing them. These can be high, especially if perpetrators try to conceal
5Lewis (1969: 97–100) argued that conventions are norms. More recently, people have argued that this
need not be the case (Bicchieri 2006; Brennan et al. 2013; Hindriks 2019). In contrast to a cooperation norm,
a coordination norm does not induce a behavioural regularity but reinforces it.
Economics and Philosophy 3
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000195
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 84.105.89.82, on 31 Aug 2021 at 09:09:12, subject to the Cambridge Core
them, as is typical for people who lie or commit adultery. Factors such as these can
account for weak institutions within an equilibrium framework.6
Theories that do not feature rules can be used to model social practices, or so
I propose. In contrast to institutions, social practices do not involve norms
(Tuomela 2002). I propose that a social practice is a regularity R in some
population P and a situation S, which is either (a) a coordination game or
(b) a mixed-motive game [PRACTICE]:7
[PRACTICE] A social practice R in a recurring situation S within population
P exists exactly if enough members of P:
1. expect everyone to conform to R,
2. prefer to conform to R (a) conditional on 1 or (b) unconditionally.
This definition entails that social practices are stable interdependent regularities.
Social practices can be (a) conventions, such as driving on the right, greeting
practices and dialects. But they can also be (b) competitive practices, such as
overfishing, an arms race, or a rat race at the workplace. As these examples
reveal, they can be local (dialects), specific to a society (in Japan, people greet by
bowing), or even more widespread (driving on the right).8
Especially because it can easily be formalized, PRACTICE offers a good basis for
modelling people’s incentives in a precise manner. This will turn out to be
particularly useful in section 2, where I develop two measures of institutional
strength. However, as I go on to argue, rule theories provide for a better way of
understanding the normative dimension of institutions norms-as-sanctions view.
1.2. Rule theories
Douglas North (1990: 3–5) characterizes institutions as the rules of the game that
define the way it is played. By doing so, they provide a conception of what to do in a
particular situation. North also claims that institutions are rules or constraints that
structure human interaction. People meet such standards of behaviour because they
6I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to discuss some of the tools that equilibrium theory has to
capture weak institutions. Becker (1968) already argued that people will break laws when the expected utility
of the action outweighs the expected cost of the punishment. Insofar as informal norms are concerned,
Keuschnigg and Wolbring (2015) argue that people rely on casual observation concerning norm
violations to estimate the expected costs of sanctions. When people perceive some form of social
disorder, they infer that those costs are low. This in turn leads to an increase in norm violations for
minor transgressions.
7Conditions 1 and 2 imply the existence of regularity R. Because of this, I do not include its existence as a
separate condition, as Lewis (1969) does. Another difference is that I do not require common knowledge
(Binmore 2008). The number of members of P that satisfy conditions 1 and 2 is high enough when
conforming to R forms a Nash equilibrium.
8According to the Folk Theorem in game theory, cooperation can be an equilibrium in an infinitely
repeated mixed-motive game. However, in practice cooperation rarely lasts long if there is no social
norm to sustain it (Fehr and Gächter 2000a, 2000b; Bicchieri 2006). Because of this, the analysis abstracts
from the possibility of cooperative practices.
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might be punished if they violate them. Thus, rule theories also invoke sanctions to
explain behaviour. And they are motivated to conform to a rule if and because it is
enforced it (North 1990: 4 and passim; Greif and Kingston 2011: 40).
Rules constrain behaviour by limiting the options people have. However, they
also enable certain actions or outcomes. Hodgson makes the point as follows:
The existence of rules implies constraints. However, such a constraint can open
up possibilities: it may enable choices and actions that otherwise would not
exist. For example: the rules of language allow us to communicate; traffic
rules help traffic to flow more easily and safely; the rule of law can increase
personal safety. Regulation is not always the antithesis of freedom; it can be
its ally. (Hodgson 2006: 2)
In light of this, Hodgson defines institutions as ‘systems of established and
embedded social rules that structure social interactions’ (Hodgson 2006: 18).
According to some rule theories, normative rules can motivate people directly.
A normative rule presents some kind of action as obligatory (ℜ). Using ‘C ’ for a
kind of action, its basic structure is: ‘In S, it is obligatory to do C ’.9 An
individual is motivated directly by a normative rule when she recognizes the
force of the obligation and this favourably inclines her to conform. Someone
who appreciates the force of an obligation will tend to feel guilt or shame when
flouting it. The fact that rules as such can motivate serves to capture the
Wittgensteinean notion of following a rule (Schatzki 1996; Bloor 1997). Someone
follows a rule exactly if she conforms to it because of the rule (Brennan et al.
2013). Insofar as normative rules are concerned, this means that she conforms
because she regards the rule as legitimate.
Hart (1961) criticizes the norms-as-sanctions view because it fails to capture this
feature of social rules. Social norms cannot be reduced to the motivating effect of
enforcement, because they can motivate directly. Hart argues that an agent who
accepts a rule thereby regards it as legitimate. Furthermore, someone who accepts
a rule treats it as a basis for justifying and criticizing conduct and regards it as a
reason for action.10 According to this Acceptance Theory, a social norm is a
generally accepted normative rule. It entails that sanctions are not always required
for people to comply with a rule. And it thereby reveals that the norms-as-sanctions
view leaves something to be desired.
However, the Acceptance Theory suffers from a significant problem: its
requirement of acceptance is too strong. Someone who accepts a rule believes in
the rule: she believes that she ought to act accordingly. But this is not required
for a rule to exist. A normative rule can in fact be in force without people
subscribing to it. It suffices if people believe that they are supposed to comply.
Consider someone who dislikes greeting acquaintances in public places such as
streets and supermarkets and regards it as a silly practice. Even though he does
9Normative rules can also permit or prohibit certain actions, or feature any other first- or second-order
right or obligation.
10By accepting a rule, an agent adopts what Hart (1961) calls ‘the internal point of view’. See Shapiro
(2006) for more on this.
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not subscribe to the local greeting norm, he is distinctly aware of the fact that he is
supposed to greet others, given that others accept the norm. And this could
influence his behaviour. Now, it might be that everybody in the population
merely expects others to accept the rule without doing so themselves. This
would suffice, I propose, for it to be in force. In fact, social norm can even be
practiced when everybody mistakenly expects the others to accept its rule.11
The point can be made more precisely by distinguishing between normative
beliefs and normative expectations. The content of a normative belief is a
normative rule: it is the belief that ℜ. Someone who has a normative belief
thereby accepts the relevant rule.12 In contrast, a normative expectation. This is
a higher-order expectation, the expectation that others believe that ℜ (cf. Bicchieri
2006, 2016). Someone who merely has a normative expectation, I will say,
acknowledges the relevant rule. Now, for a rule to be in force, people must have
a normative expectation, but not a normative belief. Hence, pace Hart (1961)
and Brennan et al. (2013), acceptance is not required, whereas acknowledgement
is. It follows that, according to what I call ‘the Acknowledgement Theory’,
a social norm is a generally acknowledged rule.
In light of this, I define the notion of a social norm as follows [NORM]:13
[NORM] A social normℜ exists in a population exactly if a substantial number
of members of P have the normative expectation that ℜ.
People who have normative expectations expect others to believe that they ought to
act in a certain way. In more colloquial terms, they believe that they are supposed to
perform that action.
1.3. The Rules-and-Equilibria theory
Institutions involve social practices as well as social norms. But how are they
connected? It will not do to require norm-compliance, because weak institutions
are institutions too. I propose instead that an institution is a social norm that
governs a social practice. This means that the social norm makes the participants
in the social practice more motivated to comply with it. In other words, the social
norm increases the agents’ payoffs for conformity. But it does not necessarily change
how they rank the options. Hence, a social norm can govern a social practice even
though the latter does not correspond to the former. This implies that a rule ℜ can
govern the corresponding regularity R as well as an alternative regularity R’. Think,
for instance, of an area where monogamy is popular but cheating even more so.
As discussed, a social norm can influence someone’s motivation to comply to a
norm directly, by increasing the payoff for conforming to it. It can also do so
indirectly through sanctions that decrease the payoff for violating it. I will say
11In such situations, they exhibit pluralistic ignorance (Prentice and Miller 1993; Kuran 1995).
12What I call ‘a normative belief’ can be interpreted as a genuine belief or in terms of some non-cognitive
attitude (Brennan et al. 2013).
13‘A substantial number’ is vague, but in a way that suits the topic in general and the goal of investigating
the strength of norms and institutions in particular.
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that, in both cases, the individual attributes weight to the norm. This notion of the
weight of a norm can be used to define that of norm-governance [GOVERN]:14
[GOVERN] A social norm ℜ governs a social practice R or R’ exactly if a
substantial number of participants attribute non-trivial weight to ℜ.
Together with PRACTICE and NORM, GOVERN defines the notion of an institution
as a norm-governed social practice. GOVERN connects the equilibrium theory of
social practices with the Acknowledgement Theory of social norms. Crucially,
this proposal implies that a social norm can govern a social practice that does
not correspond to it.
To see how all of the elements relate to one another, it is useful to present a more
detailed analysis. As before, S is an interdependent situation that can be represented
as a cooperation game or a mixed-motive game. C stands either for coordinate or for
cooperate; D for deviate or defect. When people do C this results in regularity R;
when they do D, this results in regularity R’. Given these stipulations, the notion
of an institution can be analysed as follows [INSTITUTION]:
[INSTITUTION] An institution ℜ, according to which it is obligatory to do C in
S, exists in a population P exactly if a substantial number of its members:
(1) expect a number of others to believe that ℜ,
(2) expect some to do C and others to do D,
(3) (a) believe that ℜ and/or (b) expect some to be disposed to sanction
violations, at least in part because of 1,
(4) are more favourably inclined to conform toℜ because of 2, 3a and/or 3b, and
(5) either doing C or doing D constitutes an equilibrium in S.
Condition 1 entails the existence of a social norm, condition 5 that of a social
practice, and conditions 3 and 4 capture how the former governs the latter. Thus,
the proposal explicates the conception of an institution as a norm-governed social
practice.15
As discussed, a social norm governs a social practice when it increases people’s
motivation to conform to it. It does so directly when preferences are conditional on
14For simplicity, GOVERN mentions only two possible regularities. In coordination games, there can be
more equilibria. Furthermore, regularities need not be uniform if there are differences between individuals
such that some do not conform to them.
15A population can be a social group, a society or even all of humanity. Because of this, INSTITUTION
applies at any level of generality. However, institutions at different levels can conflict. For instance,
teenagers might encourage each other to damage property by means of graffiti even though there is a
societal norm against doing so. Furthermore, institutions can require participants to differentiate
between groups. There might, for instance, be a norm that Francophone retailers in the Canadian
province of Quebec speak French to Canadians from other provinces but English to Americans. Finally,
there might be an ingroup the members of which support a norm to discriminate against an outgroup.
The proposed analysis can be developed further so as to take these complications into account. I thank
an anonymous referee for pressing me to remark on these important issues.
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normative beliefs (condition 3a).16 And it does so indirectly when preferences are
conditional on expectations about sanctions (condition 3b). A social norm can
motivate individuals in both ways. Obviously, people are motivated by a norm
or its sanctions only if they believe that the relevant norm exists. Because of this,
conditions 3a and 3b are conditional on condition 1. Furthermore, a norm can
motivate an agent without changing her behaviour. It then affects her payoffs
without changing her ranking of the available options. To allow for this,
condition 4 states that norms or sanctions more favourably incline people to
conform. Finally, condition 2 specifies empirical expectations, which are mixed
when people expect a certain proportion to do C and others D. Together, the
expectations, beliefs and preferences that people have settle whether R or R’ is
the equilibrium or social practice (condition 5).
Because of the way in which it combines rule theories and equilibria theories,
I call this ‘the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory’ (RaE) of institutions. In comparison
to rule theories, RaE is more precise in particular in how it models motivation
to comply with institutions. One of two advantages that this hybrid theory has
over pure equilibrium theories concerns their normativity. The theory captures
the motivating power of social norms along with the legitimacy they can be
taken to have. Before discussing the second advantage, I need to say more about
the relation between institutions and social norms. According to RaE, an
institution is a social norm that governs a social practice. But a social norm
need not govern a social practice in order for it to exist. In fact, it can exist
without having any effect on the members of the population to which it applies.
All that is required is that they have normative expectations (NORM). In terms of
GOVERN, a social norm constitutes an institution exactly if it non-trivially
increases people’s motivation to comply. When it does not have such an effect
or it is negligible, it is merely a social norm. In terms of INSTITUTIONS, a social
norm can exist even though conditions 2–4 are not met. Thus, the notion of an
institution is more demanding than that of a social norm.
The second advantage that RaE has over pure equilibrium theories: it provides
for a richer account of weak institutions. Equilibrium theories equate institutions
with behavioural regularities. The regularity that constitutes a weak institution
differs from that of a strong institution. Hodgson (2006) argues that
institutions are more than behaviours because they can continue to exist even
when people stop acting as they should. Such discrepancies reveal that
sometimes participants in an institution fail to meet a standard, an idea that
is at best implicit in equilibrium theory. This can be accommodated by
analysing institutions not only in terms of regularities but also in terms of
rules. The conception of an institution as a social norm that governs a social
practice does exactly that.
16When a norm motivates directly, the agent’s normative belief increases the payoff of compliance. Here
are four hypotheses about how it can do so. First, beliefs might motivate. Second, what I call ‘a belief’ is a
non-cognitive attitude that motivates as such (see note 12). Third, individuals have a desire for acting
according to their normative beliefs. Finally, they might have a ‘desire to fulfill others’ legitimate
expectations’ (Bicchieri 2006: 42).
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1.4. A comparison
The Rules-and-Equilibria theory (RaE) has close affinity to two other hybrid
theories of institutions.17 The first is the Rules-in-Equilibrium theory (RiE) of
Francesco Guala and Frank Hindriks (Hindriks and Guala 2015; Guala and
Hindriks 2015; Guala 2016). Its main innovation is that it explains coordination
in terms of signalling rules. When people face coordination problems, they rely
on correlation or signalling devices, which are public signals that correlate their
expectations (Aumann 1974; Gintis 2007). Such devices feature in signalling
rules. Using ‘Σ’ for signalling devices and ‘C’ for a coordinative action, the basic
structure of a normative signalling rule is: ‘In S, it is obligatory to do C if Σ.’
They enable people to form reliable expectations about each other’s behaviour.
As their preferences are conditional on such expectations, they will then adjust
their behaviour accordingly.
The Rules-and-Equilibria theory accommodates the notion of a signalling rule.
It can in fact be seen as an extension of RiE. First, whereas RiE models norms as
costs, RaE offers a richer account of norms that captures the idea that rules can
motivate as such. Second, RiE is restricted to coordination problems This is
why, as its name reveals, rules are in equilibrium. In contrast, RaE extends to
cooperation problems. And it allows for equilibria to come apart from the rules
that govern them. For these reasons, it is not only richer, but also has a larger scope.
RaE also has affinity with Bicchieri’s (2006, 2016) Conditional Preference theory
(CPT) of social norms. Both theories feature social norms in terms of empirical
expectations, normative expectations, sanctions and preferences that are conditional
on some or all of these factors. However, CPT applies first and foremost to
cooperation problems. Furthermore, RaE is more demanding. According to CPT,
a social norm exists exactly if people have preferences that are conditional on
empirical and normative expectations. This means that their preferences are
such that they would conform if they were to have the relevant expectations.
They do not need to have those expectations in order for the norm to exist. In
fact, people who actually have them will comply with the norm (Bicchieri 2006: 11).
In contrast, RaE requires normative expectations for a social norm to exist. As
discussed, this entails that they believe that they are supposed to conform to the
norm. Empirical expectations are needed for people to comply.
A second respect in which RaE is more demanding than CPT concerns the
motivating power of social norms. CPT explicates it in terms of preferences that
are conditional on normative expectations. If this is what motivates them, they
are concerned with acting according to the beliefs of others. Bicchieri seems to
recognize this when she observes that people who have normative expectations
might act accordingly because the ‘feel great social pressure’ (2006: 14).
RaE requires that preferences are conditional on normative beliefs as well.
Because they must have those beliefs as well, they subscribe to the norm and
take themselves to be bound by it. This means that he believes that he is
obligated to perform the relevant action. In one respect, RaE is less demanding
17See Pettit (1995, 2007), Aoki (2001) and Greif and Kingston (2011) for other hybrid theories of
institutions. In Hindriks (2021), I compare Pettit’s (1995, 2007) Virtual Control Theory (VCT) to RaE.
I argue that VCT accounts for strong institutions, but fails to accommodate weak ones.
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than CPT. INSTITUTION requires that a social norm affects people’s motivation, not
necessarily their behaviour. As condition 5 has it, the norm favourably inclines
them to conform. Because of this, the analysis explicitly accommodates the
possibility that a practice diverges from the norm that governs it. Thus, only
INSTITUTION captures the idea that a social norm can govern a social practice
that does not correspond to it.18
The upshot is that RaE provides a systematic account of both cooperation
and coordination institutions. It captures the normativity and strength of
institutions in a precise manner. Because of this, INSTITUTION forms a suitable
basis for the measures of institutional strength that I go on to develop.
2. Strength
Understanding strength is important because institutions can be valuable. There are
two sides to this. When an institution is in fact valuable, strength is a virtue. Because
of this, it is important to know which factors make it strong such that they can be
promoted. However, institutions can also harm, discriminate, dominate, exploit and
oppress people (Young 1990; Cudd 2006; Haslanger 2012). Such effects can occur
within a group of participants or between different social groups. For instance,
a racial group can develop a norm to disparage members of another racial
group in order to increase its own status (Ellickson 1991; McAdams 1995).
When institutions are objectionable in some such way, strength is a vice. A more
precise appreciation of what makes institutions weak is vital for understanding
social change.19
Thus far, I have emphasized the role of motivation in relation to institutional
strength. But this is only part of the story. An institution is weak when
compliance is low. However, an institution that is generally complied with need
not be strong, as it could be on the verge of collapse. Inspired by Guala (2016:
xxv), who characterizes institutions as ‘effective rules’, I will say that such an
institution is ‘effective.’ A strong institution differs from an effective one in
that compliance is robust. This means that people would still conform to it
under more challenging conditions. Presumably, this is why Pettit claims that
‘the investigation of resilience is vital for choosing policies and designing
institutions’ (Pettit 2007: 83). Robustness forms a safeguard against a breakdown,
and often against a loss of value.20
The strength of an institution is determined by a wide range of factors. Think, for
instance, of the leadership qualities of a president, the financial reserves held by
banks, the racist or sexist stereotypes that prevail in a society, and the sermons
people hear in church. What I am looking for, however, are generic factors that
apply to all institutions. The two key factors, I propose, are motivation and
18For a more elaborate comparison between RaE and CPT see Hindriks (2021).
19For rational choice perspectives on social change, see Knight (1992), Bicchieri (2016) and Sunstein
(2019). See Sankaran (2020) for an overview of theories of ideology critique as a means to social change.
20Pettit (2015) argues that robustness is valuable as such. The idea is that protection against a breakdown
is valuable irrespective of a pending threat, just as a secure relationship is valuable even if it is never put to
the test.
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information. As just discussed, a cooperation problem is typically solved by means
of a social norm that changes people’s motivation. That norm modifies the situation
such that interests no longer conflict. Information is key to solving coordination
problems. They feature multiple equilibria. For instance, people greet each other
in many different ways including giving a handshake or saying ‘namaste’.
Information about what others do is all that someone needs in order to successfully
coordinate with others. Because of this difference, I develop two measures of
institutional strength, one for coordination institutions and one for cooperation
institutions.
2.1. Cooperation institutions
As an example of a cooperation institution, consider littering practices in
Singapore.21 People used to dispose of chewing gum left and right. They would
leave it on pavements and on seats of public buses. And they would stick it in
mail boxes, on elevator buttons and inside keyholes, which caused maintenance
problems in high-rise public-housing apartments. The last straw was when
vandals stuck gum on the door sensors of the Mass Rapid Transit trains that
started operating in 1987, which disrupted services. This led to a ban on
chewing gum in 1992, along with hefty fines. Given that it is no longer for sale
in Singapore, it is primarily tourists who incur fines of $1,000. Singapore is now
known as ‘the Fine City’, not only because of these fines but also because of its
immaculate state. Littering has become rare more generally. Although this was
initially because of the sanctions, Singaporeans have come to take pride in
keeping the city clean. An increasing number of them will remind a family
member not to litter when they notice them doing so. In a study released in
2019, 96.3% of respondents agreed that visitors admire the city’s cleanliness.
Three things are particularly striking about this example. First, the equilibrium
has changed from littering to non-littering. Second, the new equilibrium appears to
be rather stable. And third, during the process, motivation has transformed from
predominantly indirect to primarily direct. Bicchieri (2006) argues that this
transformation is typical. Sanctions are the prime source of motivation for
conformity in the beginning. Later people comply because they perceive the
norm as legitimate. Presumably there was an informal norm back when littering
was rampant. If so, the institution used to be weak. In fact, violations were so
widespread that the equilibrium diverged from the norm. But now it is strong.
The strength of cooperation institutions, I propose, turns on the motivation of
their participants, as explicated by condition 5 of INSTITUTION. Cooperative
institutions are effective when cooperation is a minimally stable strategy, which
means that they are motivated to cooperate but barely so. Strong and weak
institutions can be characterized in terms of the notion of a motivation surplus
and that of a motivation deficit. The participants in an institution have a
motivation surplus (deficit) when they have more (less) motivation to cooperate
21See https://www.goabroad.com/articles/study-abroad/singapore-laws-to-know-before-you-go and https://
www.businessinsider.sg/singaporeans-take-pride-in-keeping-the-city-clean-and-more-than-half-will-tell-those-
around-them-not-to-litter-survey-finds/.
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than needed for compliance. An institution is strong when there is a substantial
motivation surplus. Many of its participants will continue to cooperate even if
they face pretty strong pressures to violate the norm, which means that
compliance is robust. A cooperation institution is weak when there is a significant
motivation deficit. They then need strong additional incentives to start cooperating.
The notions of a motivation surplus and a motivation deficit can be used to
develop a measure of the strength of a cooperative institution. Mixed-motive
games harbour a conflict of interests. The payoff of cooperation, given that
the others cooperate as well, is ‘c.’ The payoff of unilateral defection is ‘d ’, with
d > c. Because of this, players have an incentive to defect. But if they both do
so, the resulting outcome is the worst possible for each. The prisoner’s dilemma
exhibits this structure. In a single-shot game, the participants will defect. In a
repeated game, a social norm can enable cooperation. It does so when players
attribute enough weight to it. The weight of a social norm can be defined in
terms of so-called ‘delta-parameters’ (Crawford and Ostrom 1995). I use one for
direct motivation, which is due to the norm itself (δn), and one for indirect
motivation, which is due to sanctions (δs). The former represents the extent to
which the norm increases the payoff of conforming (c  δn); the latter the
extent to which the sanction decreases the payoff of not conforming given the
probability of being sanctioned (d−δs).
As proposed above, full compliance is required for an institution to be effective.
Now, in order for participants to be indifferent between cooperating and defecting,
the following condition has to be met: c  δn = d−δs. The two delta parameters
represent what I call ‘the weight of the norm’ (w): w = δn  δs. Participants are
indifferent when this weight equals d−c. In order for cooperation to be a
minimally stable strategy, it has to be slightly higher than this. What I call ‘the
compliance weight’ of the norm is: wc = d−c  ϵ. An institution is effective
precisely if the weight that a norm actually has (wa) is equal to its compliance
weight: wa = wc. When this is the case, the norm resolves the conflict of interests
that is inherent to cooperation games, because defection ceases to be attractive.
The notion of compliance weight can be used to define those of a motivation
surplus and a motivation deficit. There is a surplus when the actual weight is
larger than the compliance weight: wa > wb. When it is lower, there is a
motivation deficit: wa < wb. In light of this, I propose to measure the strength
of a cooperative institution in terms of the following ratio (with ‘SCOOP’ for the
strength of a cooperative institution):
SCOOP  wa=wc
This ratio equals 1 for effective institutions; it is (substantially) higher than 1 for
strong institutions; and it is (substantially) lower than 1 for weak institutions.
Given that wa = δna  δsa and wc = d−c  ϵ, this is equivalent to: (δna  δsa)/
(d−c  ϵ). Thus, the proposed measure is a function of the payoffs for
cooperating and defecting and of direct and indirect motivations of the cooperative
norm. SCOOP measures the relative distance between the weight of the norm and the
point at which it tips the balance in favour of conformity.
By way of an example, consider cheating on an exam. Students prefer cheating to
not cheating: d= 20 and c= 10. They are indifferent when the weight of this
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norm is: wc= δnc δsc= d−c= 10. Suppose that an honour code is introduced that
prohibits cheating along with appropriate sanctions. Students care quite a lot about
sanctions and only a little about the code as such: δas= 4, δan= 2. In that case, they
attribute the following weight to it: wa= 6. The strength of the honor code at their
university is s= 0.6. This means that the students suffer from a motivational deficit.
Norm-violation will be widespread. Hence, the institution is rather weak. As it
happens, students at another university are in the exact same situation except
that they are substantially more moved by the thought that cheating is wrong,
such that δan= 8. The total weight of (this part of) the honour code at their
university is wa= 12. This means that the strength of their institution is s= 1.2.
In this case, the institution is fairly strong. Students robustly comply with its
norm. In this way, the proposed measure captures the strength of cooperation
institutions.
2.2. Coordination institutions
According to a famous Italian proverb, traffic lights are instructions in Milan,
suggestions in Rome and decorations in Naples (Guala 2016: xxiv). I take this to
imply that that traffic practices approximate traffic rules in Milan, whereas they
frequently deviate from them in Rome and even more often in Naples. This in
turn suggests that traffic rules are stronger in the north as compared to the
middle of Italy and they are virtually non-existent in the south. It is tempting to
explain this in terms of the motivation of traffic participants. The different
degrees of conformity would then reflect the fact that in Milan people are much
more committed to following traffic rules than people in Rome, while in Naples
they are not committed to them at all. However, it is not obvious that this is
correct. Traffic lights resolve coordination problems, which turn on information
rather than motivation.
In light of this, I propose to measure the strength of coordination institutions in
terms of empirical expectations. Condition 2 of INSTITUTION allows for players to
expect partial conformity. The idea is to measure the strength of a convention in
terms of the expected degree of conformity (dc). The baseline is the tipping
point, the expected degree of conformity at which people switch from one
equilibrium to another (dct). In these terms, the proposal for a measure of the
strength of a coordinative institution is as follows (with ‘SCOOR’ for the strength
of coordination institutions):
SCOOR  dca=dct
When this ratio equals 1, the coordinative institution is effective. And when it is
substantially higher (lower) than 1, it is strong (weak).
An important feature of conventions is that they are self-enforcing. This supports
a particular dynamic for empirical expectations. When SCOOR is larger than one, it
will tend to increase. And when it is smaller than one, it will in all likelihood
decrease such that the practice goes out of existence, although this can take
some time. This suggests that there are few conventions that are moderately
strong or weak. Consider Sweden’s 1967 switch from driving on the left to
driving on the right. Driving on the left caused a fair number of traffic accidents
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for two reasons. First, because of the large amount of cross-border traffic from
neighboring countries where they drove on the right. Second, because the vast
majority of cars in Sweden were left-hand drive vehicles. The change was widely
unpopular, which made the political process far from easy. Even so, the changeover
went relatively smoothly. The number of accidents actually went down for a period
of six weeks.
To effect the change, practical obstacles had to be overcome, including changing
traffic signs and relocating bus stops. However, the crucial step was an information
campaign backed by the authorities. By changing their empirical expectations, it
enabled the Swedes to move away from the suboptimal equilibrium they were
locked into. Within less than a day, the Swedes changed their behaviour from
almost full compliance to one rule to almost full compliance to its alternative.
In light of this, Bicchieri observes that ‘a governmental diktat may easily work
for conventions (such as traffic rules)’ (2016: 144). She adds that, in such cases,
‘the law coordinates behaviour via the creation of new expectations’ (Bicchieri
2016: 144).
Even though coordination institutions are problems of information, they also
have a normative dimension. Because coordinative regularities are self-enforcing,
social norms merely add to the strength of a convention. They reinforce or
stabilize them. Consider a pure coordination game in which the payoff for
coordinating is ‘c’ and that for deviating from the existing regularity is ‘d ’ with
d= 0. A coordination norm makes coordinating more attractive. The extent to
which it increases motivation is given by the weight people attribute to its norm,
w = δn  δs. The extent to which a social norm contributes to people’s
motivation to conform is w/c. Such motivation might make people more careful,
enhance their focus and decrease the number of mistakes they make. This
suggests that social norms can contribute to the strength of a coordinative
institution. More specifically, they determine the strength that the institution has
over and above that of the social practice.
The significance of social norms can be illustrated by Mackie’s (1996) famous
study of footbinding in China and how this practice came to an end.
Footbinding was introduced at the imperial palace, in all likelihood to promote
fidelity control. It spread to the upper class and was copied by the middle and
lower classes: ‘the higher the social status, the smaller the foot’ (Mackie 1996:
1001). Footbinding became popular in spite of its costs: about 10% died of
complications; those who survived were pretty much housebound. In fact, bound
feet became regarded as a sign of beauty and unbound feet were seen as
disgraceful. Only the lowest classes, which needed women to work, formed an
exception. Crucially, bound feet were required to be eligible as a wife. The idea
was that it fostered fidelity and thereby family honor and it increased paternity
confidence. In light of this, Mackie argues that it was a suboptimal coordination
equilibrium, which played a central role in the marriage market. The practice
prevailed for almost a thousand years. Strikingly, it unravelled within a generation.
Mackie takes this to confirm his characterization of the practice as a convention.
Mackie identifies three steps as crucial for its demise: an education campaign,
external pressure and the formation of natural foot societies. The education
campaign served to raised awareness of just how unhealthy the practice was and
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of what the advantages are of unbound feet. External pressure was exerted by other
countries who denounced foot binding because of its negative health consequences.
The Chinese had adopted all kinds of rationalizations. For instance, women were
seen as ‘excessively lustful’, which is why guarding had become regarded as the
natural thing to do. Critical responses to the practice challenged such beliefs and
revealed that they were not as compelling as they had come to be seen. Such
denunciations questioned the legitimacy of the norm, in particular the normative
beliefs that supported it. These challenges to the norm and its sanctions made
the existing practice look less attractive, which enabled the Chinese to more fully
appreciate the appeal of the alternative. It made them realize, that the prevailing
practice constituted a suboptimal equilibrium.
But they did not change the fact that the Chinese were locked into
this practice. Given that others participated, the best response remained to do so
as well. Parents want their daughters to be successful and that getting married is
a substantial part of it. And they jeopardize this by unilaterally deviating
from the practice. This problem was ultimately resolved by the formation of
natural-foot societies. The members of those societies ‘pledged not to bind their
daughters’ feet nor to let their sons marry women with bound feet’ (Mackie
1996: 1011). The underlying idea was: ‘the greater the proportion of people who
footbind, the less is footbinding a positional advantage in securing marriage’
(Mackie 1996: 1012). Natural foot societies provided people with a real
alternative due to which violating the norm did not come with the cost of
daughters not being able to marry. Those societies turned out to be successful
and allowed the new practice of not binding feet to spread. They changed
the empirical expectations of their participants (Mackie 1996; see also
Bicchieri 2016).
Mackie’s account of conventional change confirms that empirical expectations
do indeed form the key to the strength of coordination institutions. As it
supports SCOOR as a measure thereof. Furthermore, it also reveals how
important normative beliefs and sanctions are in this respect. This in turn
confirms that w/c as a second indicator. In addition to this, it illustrates how
difficult it is to change a convention. The main problem is that providing
information about a better alternative does, as such, nothing to change people’s
empirical expectations. If people see others continue as before, they have little
reason to change their own behaviour.
Even so, it is easy to overestimate the effect of information. Consider ‘Chastia’, an
imaginary society in which people behave in a chaste manner and disapprove of
unchaste behaviour (Brennan et al. 2013: 25). However, they secretly prefer to
behave in unchaste ways, but only if others display unchaste behaviour a well
and expect each other to do so. Spiekermann (2015: 177) suggests that ‘Chastia
could quite easily experience a normative revolution once it became apparent
that most Chastians have conditional preferences in line with the lewd norm’.
This claim fails to do justice to the lock-in effect of prevailing expectations.
Thus, information is the primary determinant of the strength of coordination
institutions, and normativity a secondary one. However, there are others. To the
extent that preferences are subject to change, for instance, they affect the
strength of a coordination institution as well. Think, for instance, of someone
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who already has a few dents in his car. Because of this, he might come to care less
about minor accidents and be willing to take more risks.22 When Lewis’ (1969)
introduced his account of conventions, he proposed a measure of what he called
‘the degree of conventionality’, which encompassed all of the elements of his
analysis. It consists of six dimensions: the degree of conformity, the fraction of
players who expect conformity, the fraction of players who are expected to
conform, the fraction of players who prefer to conform, the fraction of players
who prefer to conform to the alternative convention, and the fraction of situations
in which this is the case (Lewis 1969: 76–80). Each of these factors also bear on the
strength of a convention.23
In order for any such factor to be an indicator of institutional strength, it has to
be compared to a threshold value of that factor, as in SCOOR. Furthermore, I have
chosen to single out some of these factors as more important than the others, in
particular the extent to which players expect conformity. There is, for instance,
little reason to zoom in on the proportion of people who expect conformity,
unless some people are in a better position to observe behaviour than others.
The final difference concerns the normative dimension of conventions. Lewis
(1969: 97) regards conventions as ‘a species of norm’. In spite of this, he does
not incorporate the effect that norms have on motivation in his measure. I have
argued that it is important to do so.
The upshot is that motivation is the main determinant of the strength of
cooperation institutions, and information that of coordination institutions.
Because of this, the strength of the former can be measured in terms of the weight
that participants attribute to a norm, and the latter in terms of the expected degree
of conformity.
3. Conclusion
Institutions are norm-governed practices. This view preserves the explanatory
power of equilibrium theories. And it captures the normative dimension of
institutions in a way similar to rule theories. Crucially, a social norm can govern
a social practice even if the latter does not correspond to the former, as long as
the participants experience its pull or push. Because of this, the Rules-and-
Equilibria Theory can account for weak institutions. As such, it provides a
suitable basis for an account of institutional strength. I have argued that this
notion should be understood in terms of compliance and robustness. Weak
institutions are frequently violated. Effective institutions rarely if ever. And
strong institutions are complied with in a robust manner. Because of this, they
will remain effective if they meet with substantial challenges.
22For this to be the case, he must be tempted to deviate, which means that the situation does not
constitute a pure coordination game. In this vein, Sugden (1998) argues that conforming to a convention
sometimes runs counter to someone’s self-interest.
23External shocks can also induce change. Bicchieri (2016) mentions the impact that the contraceptive pill
had on the sexual revolution. Consider also the fact that viruses can spread through physical contact. During
the coronavirus pandemic, this brought the practice of shaking hands as a way of greeting someone to a
grinding halt.
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Coordinative institutions are almost always effective if not strong, because the
interests of their participants align. In contrast, cooperation institutions are
effective or strong only if their norms resolve the conflicts of interests between
the participants. Otherwise, they are weak. This difference is due to the fact that
coordination institutions are problems of information, whereas cooperation
institutions are problems of motivation. Because of this, the strength of these
two kinds of institutions should be measured differently. The primary determinant
of the strength of coordination institutions is the expected degree of conformity.
The main factor that makes cooperation institutions strong is the weight people
attribute to its norm. This account of institutional strength sheds light on how
valuable institutions can be strengthened and how harmful or unjust institutions
can be transformed.
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